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Background: The dominance of veterinary paraprofessionals in the animal health markets has been linked to the
decline in quality of veterinary services. This study uses a role play experiment to analyze how the interaction of
farmers and service providers influences the quality and the demand for clinical services for cattle. The quality of
clinical services was measured by scoring the accuracy of the service provider prescribing the appropriate drug for
selected cattle diseases.
Methods: The game was played in four rounds. Farmers were given “animal medical card” with the name of the
disease written on it both in English and the local language in each round. Service providers were asked to write
the clinical signs, and prescribe the drugs.
Results: The results show that the ability to identify the signs of different diseases and the accuracy of prescriptions by
veterinarians is not significantly different from that of paraprofessionals trained in veterinary science. However, the
ability of service providers who are not trained in veterinary medicine to perform these tasks is significantly lower than
that of service providers trained in veterinary science. The continued interaction between paraprofessionals and
veterinarians gradually leads to an improvement in the ability of paraprofessionals trained in general agriculture and
social sciences to perform these tasks. This was not the case for paraprofessionals with no formal training or education.
Farmers do not easily change their beliefs about paraprofessionals, even if they receive information on their inability to
diagnose diseases correctly and prescribe the correct drugs. Belief updating depends not only on the outcome of the
previous round, but also on the gender of the farmer and the livestock production system.
Conclusion: This paper argues that the slow pace in which farmers update their beliefs about paraprofessionals limits
paraprofessionals’ willingness to learn or consult with veterinarians. However, the use of “animal health cards” (records
of diagnoses and treatments) could induce paraprofessionals to provide services of better quality clinical services for
cattle and enable farmers to measure the quality of these services.
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This paper is concerned with measuring and assessing the
quality of clinical veterinary services in developing coun-
tries, using Uganda as an example. The existence of vete-
rinarians and paraprofessionals of varying skills and
training can be a major problem in animal health markets
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article, unless otherwise stated.unqualified service providers and professionals trained in
general agriculture that may be providing less quality
services compared with services of veterinarians [2]. Live-
stock farmers who have no skills or training in veterinary
science are not able to measure the quality of services be-
ing offered by these service providers. The failure of a
farmer to assess and measure the quality of the service
creates motivation problems such that a farmer is not will-
ing to pay a premium fee for the service because he can-
not judge the quality of the service he or she receives. As a
result, service providers that deliver high quality servicestral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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vince the farmer that their services are of high quality [3].
Since service providers interact repeatedly with farmers,
farmers’ failure to differentiate the quality of the service
leads to high quality service providers being displaced or
nudged off the market. Akerlof [4] describes this interface
between quality heterogeneity and asymmetric informa-
tion resulting to the disappearance of a market with qual-
ity goods and services as a market for “lemons”. As argued
by Ly [3], a market for “lemon” has occurred in animal
health markets in most developing countries, and the vet-
erinary paraprofessionals have dominated the animal
health market.
The dominance of the veterinary paraprofessionals in the
provision of veterinary services, although useful in redu-
cing costs and increasing access, has been linked to the de-
cline in the quality of veterinary services [5,6]. Improving
relationship between veterinarians and paraprofessionals is
seen as an important approach towards improving the
quality of clinical veterinary services [7-9]. In addition, the
economic literature on the provision of animal health ser-
vices emphasizes that if farmers had information about the
quality of service offered, they would be able to update
their beliefs and more readily seek services of veterinarians
who offer quality services. Belief updating (belief change) is
the act of changing a previously held belief to take into ac-
count new information [10]. By seeking quality services,
paraprofessionals or low quality service providers would
strive to consult with veterinarians in order to maintain
and build their reputation.
In this study, a role play game experiment was used to
assess the influence of information on farmers’ beliefs
about service providers and the quality of clinical services.
In particular, the study aimed at answering the following
questions: (1) Does the quality of services provided by
paraprofessionals differ with that provided by veterinar-
ians? (2) Does quality improve as paraprofessionals and
veterinarians interact? (3) Do farmers update their beliefs
about service providers? And (4) what factors influence
farmer belief updating? The paper proceeds as follows:
Section 2 covers materials and methods; Section 3 pre-
sents the results, and Section 4 discusses the findings and
provides a conclusion.
Methods
This study is part of the project aimed at analysing institu-
tional arrangements for providing veterinary services in
Uganda and Kenya. Ethical approval of prospective enrol-
ment of humans to the study was obtained from the com-
mittees at directorates of the veterinary services at
Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries in
Uganda and the Ministry of Livestock in Kenya. The refer-
ence number for Kenya is RES/GEN/VOL.X11/63. The
reference number for Uganda was not obtained, but verbalpermission form directorate of animal resources was ob-
tained. Consideration was also given to welfare of the sub-
jects, and we are confident that the study did not pose any
risk to the subjects since clinical trials were not involved.
We also received permission from local governments and
one staff in the veterinary department was assigned to
work with us in each district. Consent of the subjects was
also obtained.
Design of the game
The experimental data used in this paper were collected
from two different districts in Uganda (referred to here as
A and B to ensure the anonymity of the participants). Dis-
trict A is located in the pastoral production system while
District B is located in the intensive livestock production
system. Subjects were recruited from each district. The
subjects included the farmers, paraprofessionals and veter-
inarians. They were asked whether they agreed to partici-
pate in a role play game. Farmers were told they would be
paid, and their pay-off would depend on the outcome of
the transaction (treatment of a sick animal in the role
play) and their ability to negotiate with service providers
for a fee the providers would charge. The farmers were
provided with an initial endowment of 6,000 Uganda
Shillings (US$2), which was approximately three times the
daily wage for unskilled labour in the study regions. If the
outcome was positive, a farmer would be paid a reward
covering the difference between the fee of the service pro-
vider and the initial endowment. A positive outcome was
one where the animal was cured, which happened if the
service providers identified the right drug for the disease
of the animal under consideration. If the outcome was
negative, the farmer received nothing. A negative outcome
means that the animal died because the service provider
was not able to identify the appropriate treatment. Service
providers were informed that their earning would depend
on their reputation with farmers, which determined the
number of farmers who demanded their service, and the
professional fee they charged. Service providers were
allowed to refer and consult other service providers. The
cost of transport and drugs was considered as dead weight
costs and hence not included in the game.
A total of 51 farmers were recruited to participate in the
experiment, 26 in the pastoral livestock production system
(10 female and 16 male) and 25 in the intensive livestock
production system (12 female and 13 male). In each pro-
duction system, it was planned to recruit two veterinarians
and five paraprofessionals to participate in the game. In
District A (pastoral area), however, veterinarians are usu-
ally absent from their duty stations because there are few
trained veterinarians from these areas, and professionals
from non-pastoral ethnic groups are often reluctant to
work in pastoral areas because of the harsh climate and
poor infrastructure [11]. Therefore, two government
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in veterinary medicine were asked to act as veterinarians
in the role play. Their performance in terms of disease
diagnosis and drug prescription was later compared with
that of veterinarians in District B, and it was found that
there was no statistically significant difference in their
scores. Therefore, it can be assumed that this replacement
does not affect the results. The training level of the para-
professionals differed between the districts. In the pastoral
system, two of the paraprofessionals had diplomas in so-
cial science with three months of training in animal health,
and the other three had either primary or no education,
and they also had received three months of training in ani-
mal health. Three paraprofessionals in the intensive pro-
duction system had certificates in general agriculture, and
two had diplomas in general agriculture. In District B,
there were no female service providers and in District A,
two of paraprofessionals were women and the rest of the
service providers were male. In the intensive system, three
endemic livestock diseases that were identified and they
are; East Coast Fever, Anaplasmosis, and Tryponamiasis.
In the pastoral systems, extra two diseases were added,
namely, Heart Water and Red Water.
The game proceeded as follows: Farmers were given a
so-called “animal medical card” with the name of the dis-
ease written on it both in the local language (Pokot and
Luganda) and in English. The animal medical cards were
distributed to the farmers on a random basis. Farmers were
asked to choose any service provider of his or her choice
to treat a particular disease. The service provider chosen
by the farmer had to list the signs associated with the dis-
ease (corresponding to performing a clinical diagnosis in
real life) and prescribe the drugs. The service provider also
had to agree on the costs of treatment with a farmer. The
costs were broken down into the professional fee, cost
of drugs and transport fee. All this information was
written down on the animal medical card. Two of the
paraprofessionals in the pastoral areas who could not readTable 1 Clinical signs and drugs for specific animal diseases
Disease Clinical signs
East Coast Fever High temperature of about 40°C, swollen lymph
nodes, increased breathing loss of appetite, nasal
discharge, cough, white discharge in the eyes
Anaplasmosis High temperature (41°C), severe constipation, loss
of appetite, loss of body weight, increased breathing
and dry mouth
Trypanosomiasis High temperature, stunning hair, loss of body weight,
lacrimation (crying), blood discharge from the ears or
skin, mucus discharge and brown urine.
Heart Water Turning in circles, grinding of the teeth, sensitivity to
touch, nasal discharge and high temperature
Red Water Reddish urine, high temperature, loss of appetite,
laboured breathing and weight loss
Source: Authors.or write in English were assisted by hired university stu-
dents with no veterinary training. The students were
instructed to write only what the paraprofessionals told
them to write. The cards were later handed back to the
farmers who presented the cards to the researcher. The re-
searcher would then assign the outcomes based on drug
prescription. Outcomes were categorized as positive and
negative. As indicated above, a positive outcome is one
where the animal is cured (appropriate drug prescribed)
while a negative outcome is one where the animal died
(wrong drug is prescribed). The signs of the diseases and
the treatment are presented in Table 1 below. It was de-
signed by consulting the practicing veterinarians, the Merck
Veterinary manual a and the OIE technical disease cards b.
The game was played in four rounds, and at the begin-
ning of each round, the farmers received a new medical
card. At the end of each round, both farmers and service
providers received information about the outcomes, and
their pay-offs were awarded. After the game, the partici-
pants were invited to share their reflections, and finally,
the meal was served.
Analysis of data
To measure the quality of clinical cattle services and the
effect of farmers’ decisions on the demand and quality of
clinical veterinary services, the degree of accuracy in
identifying the signs of the disease listed on the animal
medical card and prescribing the appropriate treatment
were used as indicators of quality of service provision.
After every round, the participants were able to consult
and share their results with others. The scores for every
round were awarded as presented in Table 1. Each car-
dinal sign identified was awarded a score of one and the
total score was transformed into percentage. In the case
of drug prescription, scores were awarded based on the
drugs prescribed by the service providers. As shown in
Table 1 below, if a service provider prescribed one of the
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pending on the disease. These scores were transformed
into percentages and since eight points was the lowest
score for prescribing the main drug, the pass mark could
be set at 80%.
The data from the role play were entered into a data-
base and analysed as follows: Scatter diagrams were used
to analyse the quality of clinical diagnosis and drug pre-
scription for each disease. Learning curves were con-
structed to examine whether the quality improved with
experience or after paraprofessionals interacted with
veterinarians. Learning curves are used in clinical medi-
cine to measure quality of service, and they are derived
by graphically plotting performance against experience
gained from the acquisition of new information or
knowledge from prior experience [12]. Hopper et al. [13]
argue that a steep learning curve implies that skills are
acquired rapidly because the procedure is simple. In this
particular case, a steep slope would mean service pro-
viders are consulting or learning from each other to
build and maintain their reputation. Farmers’ belief up-
dating curves were also constructed to examine whether
farmers update their beliefs or change their beliefs about
types of service providers. The slope of the curve mea-
sures the level of belief change or updating [10,14].
Service providers were categorized into veterinarians
and paraprofessionals. The latter were further differenti-
ated by field and level of training. The mean scores in
drug prescription for each category in each round were
computed and plotted on a Cartesian axis in order to
construct the learning curves. In addition, the total
number of farmers seeking services from the different
categories of service providers in each round was com-
puted, and the results were used to construct farmers’
belief updating curves.
Non-parametric statistics were used to perform statis-
tical tests because the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality
and the Doornik-Hansen test for multivariate normality
showed that the data violated the normality assumption.
Since the normality assumption was violated, parametric
tests were considered to be less powerful than the non-
parametric tests because they do not assume normality
[15]. A panel probit model with random-coefficient that
allows for unobserved heterogeneity in farmers’ belief
updating in each round was estimated to determine fac-
tors that influence farmers belief updating. In the model,
belief updating is measured as a farmer’s decision to
change to a different service provider from the previous
service provider. A random effects model was chosen
because (1) the observations are many, but the number
of rounds are few (R = 4); thus a fixed effect model
would give inconsistent estimates, and (2) a random ef-
fects model allows one to make inferences about the
whole population, something that cannot be done with afixed effects model [16]. Maddala [16] further notes that
the probit model is well suited for estimating random
effects because it produces correlations among errors yet
logistic distribution is very restrictive for this purpose.
Gibbons & Hedeker [17] used it to predict the probability
of some doctors experiencing malpractice claims and in
this paper it is used to determine factors that influence
livestock farmers’ decision to change service provider.
Three models were estimated because of collinearity in
the variables. In model one, sex of farmer, pay-offs of
farmers, fees charged by service provider and livestock
production systems were included in the model. Farmers’
education level and previous outcome were excluded be-
cause they were correlated with production system and
pay-offs, respectively. In the model two, variable or pro-
duction system was dropped, and farmers’ education was
included. In model three, the pay-off variable was
dropped, and the outcome variable was included and stan-
dardized beta values of the independent variables were re-
ported because they show which of the independent
variables have a greater effect on the probability to change
service providers.
Results
Analysis of service quality by disease
Results from the Kruskal-Wallis and Kolmogorov-Smirnov
non-parametric test showed that there is no statistical evi-
dence to suggest that the scores of government animal
health assistants in the pastoral areas in clinical diagnosis
and prescription were different from the scores of the vet-
erinarians (p < 0.05). The mean score achieved by govern-
ment animal health assistants for identifying all signs of
the disease (clinical diagnosis) were 58%, and the mean
score for drug prescription was 98%. Veterinarians had a
score of 53% for clinical diagnosis and 99% in drug pre-
scription. Consequently, the term “veterinarian” as used in
this paper includes both the veterinarians and the govern-
ment animal health assistants trained in veterinary science,
who acted as veterinarians in the role play in the pastoral
area. Paraprofessionals include service providers with a
diploma and or a certificate in agriculture or social science.
Community animal health workers (CAHWs) are those
service providers who have received some training in
animal health services, but do not hold a diploma or
certificate.
Figure 1 is a scatter diagram of the overall scores in clin-
ical diagnosis and drug prescription. Results show that the
veterinarians’ average score in drug prescription was always
close to 100%, but in identifying the signs of the respective
diseases, sometimes the veterinarians scored below 50%.
The results from Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test
showed that there was a statistically significant difference
between paraprofessionals and veterinarians in drug pre-
scription, but not in clinical diagnosis. Consequently, the
Figure 1 The scatter diagram for veterinarians and paraprofessionals overall scores in diagnosis and prescription.
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drug prescription as a measure of the quality of service.
The results of Kruskal-Wallis test revealed the pres-
ence of significant evidence to suggest that the level of
drug prescription varied according to disease (p < 0.05).
Figures 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 are scatter diagrams for clinical
diagnosis and prescription for each endemic disease. Six
of the cases in ECF had a score of below 80% in drug
prescription, four of which are from the intensive pro-
duction system and two from the pastoral system. Three
cases of the wrong prescription were from the same ser-
vice provider, who had a diploma in crop science. This
service provider was not interested in consulting with
other service providers even after receiving the informa-
tion that his prescription was inaccurate. He kept on
prescribing Oxytetracycline, multivitamins and Imisol
for ECF. The remaining case in the intensive system was
handled by the service provider with a certificate in gen-
eral agriculture. In the pastoral area, the two cases of in-
accurate prescription were from a service provider who
did not have any formal education, and the cases were
recorded in rounds one and two. He also did not consultFigure 2 Veterinarians and paraprofessionals scores in the treatmentwith veterinarians or other service providers. The pre-
scription in both cases was only Oxytetracycline.
For Anaplasmoisis, there were thirteen cases with a
score of below 80% in drug prescription; six cases were
from the intensive system and seven from the pastoral sys-
tem. In the intensive system, these service providers pre-
scribed mainly multivitamins, Oxytetracycline, Butarex,
Suriname, and Diminazene. In the pastoral areas, the pre-
scriptions were mainly Oxytetracycline, multivitamins,
and the following treatment: mixing either one litre or
one-half litre of the cooking oil with one sachet OMO
washing detergent. This sounds strange, but both service
providers and farmers argued that using cooking oil and
washing detergent yields positive results for Anaplasmosis.
In the case of Tryponamiasis, there were five cases
where the score was below 80% in drug prescription,
and all of these cases were from pastoral system. Two of
the cases were from one service provider trained in so-
cial science, and three from service providers with no
formal education. The drugs prescribed were Berenil
and Oxytetracycline. Red Water and Heart Water had
three cases each that recorded a score below 80% inof East Coast Fever.
Figure 3 Veterinarian and paraprofessional scores in the treatment of Anaplasmosis.
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professionals without formal education, and the pre-
scription for all the diseases in six cases was pen-strep.
Learning curves and quality of veterinary services
The results from Kolmogorov-Smirnov test show that
there is a statistically significant difference between the
scores of paraprofessional and veterinarians regarding
drug prescription, but not regarding clinical diagnosis (p <
0.05). The mean scores attained by paraprofessionals in
clinical diagnosis and drug prescription were 50% and
72%, respectively. Veterinarians had a mean score of 56%
in clinical diagnosis and 99% in drug prescription. Since
scores of clinical diagnosis were not significantly different
between paraprofessionals and veterinarians, accuracy in
drug prescription was considered as a measure of service
quality. The results from Kruskal-Wallis test show that
the mean scores of drug prescription differed significantly
by field of training and production system (p < 0.01). Also,
only scores of drug prescription in rounds one and four
were significantly different (p < 0.05).
Figure 7 shows the learning curves of paraprofessionals
and veterinarians. The veterinarians’ curve shows that vet-
erinarians are operating at maximum with an averageFigure 4 Veterinarian and paraprofessional scores in the treatment oscore of 99% in drug diagnosis. The average score of para-
professionals was below the 80% pass mark. In round one,
the average score of paraprofessionals in drug prescription
was 60%, and in round two it was 75% and no significant
change was registered in round three. In round four, the
average score increased to 88%. Figure 8 shows learning
curves of service providers by field of training. The learn-
ing curves for service providers trained in veterinary sci-
ence shows that they operate at maximum as expected.
The average scores of service providers with a social sci-
ence background were 71%, 91%, 90% and 88% in rounds
one to four, respectively. The learning curve took the
shape of an asymptotic curve as shown in Figure 8. Para-
professionals trained in general agricultural had a slow,
but gradually increasing learning curve with scores of
74%, 79%, 82%, and 94% in rounds one to four, respect-
ively. The scores of paraprofessionals trained in agriculture
and social science were not significantly different at p <
0.05. The learning curves of paraprofessionals with no for-
mal education took the shape of a sigmoid curve, and the
average score in drug prescription of non-educated para-
professionals failed to reach 80% even with continued
interaction between paraprofessionals and veterinarians.
The score were 24%, 45%, 33% and 77% in rounds one tof Tryponamiasis.
Figure 5 Veterinarian and paraprofessional scores in the treatment of Heart Water.
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that the quality of clinical veterinary services in the pas-
toral system is lower than that in the intensive system.
The learning curve of intensive system is gradually in-
creasing, while that of the pastoral system takes a sig-
moidal shape.
Demand for clinical services
Figures 10 and 11 present the farmers’ belief updating
curves with regard to the services of veterinarians and
paraprofessionals in the intensive and pastoral system, re-
spectively. The curves show that, in the intensive system,
farmers do not easily update their beliefs about parapro-
fessionals. The belief updating curves were perfectly in-
elastic even with experience of interaction up to round
three. This means that even when farmers get negative re-
sults, they still go back to the same paraprofessional or
seek services of another paraprofessional but not services
of veterinarians. In round four, the demand for veterinary
paraprofessional services declined while that of veterinar-
ians increased. In the pastoral systems, the demand for the
services of veterinarians gradually increased while that of
paraprofessionals gradually decreased.
Figure 12 shows that service providers with agricul-
tural training were found only in the intensive livestock
system while those with no formal training and socialFigure 6 Veterinarian and paraprofessional scores in the treatment oscience training were found only in the pastoral livestock
production system. The farmers’ belief updating curves
for service providers trained in social sciences and agri-
culture were inelastic between rounds one and three,
and a decline was recorded in round four. The decline
in round four can be associated with the increase in the
demand for services of veterinary-trained service pro-
viders since the demand for service providers without
formal education remain constant. The farmers’ belief
updating curve for veterinary-trained service providers
gradually increased while that of service providers with-
out formal education gradually declined.
As shown in Table 2, results from model one show
that being female and having a high pay-off reduces the
likelihood of changing service providers. Farmers in the
intensive production system are more likely to change
service providers than those in the pastoral system. As
the descriptive statistics show, most of the changes were
made from one paraprofessional to another and not to a
veterinarian at least up to round four, see Figure 10
above. In model one; the livestock production system
had a high significant effect on the decision to change,
followed by pay-off and gender. In Model 2, results show
that an educated farmer is more likely to change service
providers than an uneducated farmer and education had
a higher significant effect than pay-off. In Model 3,f Red Water.
Figure 7 Learning curves by type of the service provider. Figure 9 Learning curves by livestock production system.
Ilukor and Birner BMC Research Notes 2014, 7:894 Page 8 of 12
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1756-0500/7/894results revealed that the outcome of the previous transac-
tion influences a farmer’s decision to change service pro-
viders, but the livestock production system had a higher
significant effect, followed by outcome and sex. In all
models, a fee charged by service providers in the previous
transaction does not influence the decision to change
providers. The likelihood that farmers change service pro-
viders was predicted using Stata post-estimation com-
mands and the results showed that farmers are more likely
to change to veterinarians than to paraprofessionals, as
shown in Figure 13.Figure 8 Learning curves by field of training of service
providers.Discussion
The objective of this study was to determine whether
quality of clinical services for cattle differ between veter-
inary paraprofessionals, examine farmer’s choices of vet-
erinary advice and implications of these choices on the
quality of clinical services. The results show that para-
professionals trained in veterinary science are capable of
handling endemic cattle diseases just like trained veter-
inary professionals. However, the ability of paraprofes-
sionals who are not trained in veterinary science is
significantly lower than those of the service providersFigure 10 Farmers’ belief updating curves about service
providers in the intensive production system.
Figure 11 Farmers’ belief updating curves about service
providers in the pastoral system.
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prescription by paraprofessionals was in the treatment of
ECF and Anaplasmoisis. The learning curve for crop
trained service providers was slowly increasing while
those of the social science trained service providers as-
sumed an asymptotic curve. The learning curve for ser-
vice providers with no formal education took a sigmoid
shape. Hopper et al. [13] suggest that the slow rise learn-
ing is an indication of a difficult task, while the asymp-
totic curve can be associated with quick learning.
However, in this particular case, the slow rise in the
learning curve may be attributed to low propensityFigure 12 Farmers’ belief updating curves about service
providers of different fields of training.to consult, while asymptotic curve can be attributed to
the high propensity to consult. The learning curves also
reveal that paraprofessionals were not performing well
from round one to three and the best performance was
recorded in round four.
The poor performance in round one to three can be
explained by the unwillingness of paraprofessionals to
consult with veterinarians while improved performance
in round four can be explained by the loss of farmers to
other providers. As the feedback meeting held after the
game revealed, there are trade-off in consulting with
other veterinarians. On one hand, consulting with veteri-
narians may increase the likelihood of losing a client to
a veterinarian because farmers would lose confidence in
them and veterinarians would use that as an opportunity
to discredit them in front of their clients. On the other
hand, consulting with veterinarians helps paraprofes-
sionals to save face in front of their clients by avoiding
negative outcomes. Secondly, farmers take a long to
change their beliefs about the paraprofessionals. Thus,
paraprofessionals have limited incentives to consult with
veterinarians to save face in front of the farmers. As re-
vealed by farmers during the feedback meeting, they
would go back to the same paraprofessionals even when
the previous outcome was negative because they knew
them and would always want to give them the benefit of
the doubt. The third reason could be a language prob-
lem which limits non-educated paraprofessionals to
interact with veterinarians since most of the veterinar-
ians especially is pastoral areas are not from same ethnic
background [9].
The results generally contradict the findings by IDL
[18], Oakeley et al. [19] and Admassu et al. [20] which
showed that informal trained paraprofessionals as capable
of performing diagnosis and drug prescription. For ex-
ample, Oakeley et al. [19] conducted a random survey of
veterinary service providers, including Community Ani-
mal Health Workers (CAHWs), who were only trained on
the job, to examine the level of accuracy in drug diagnoses
among different types of service providers. Their results
showed that 85% of the diagnoses made by CAHWs were
accurate. However, Curran & MacLehose [21] dismissed
this finding on grounds that they do not have proper
research design to assess the level of drug prescription,
and in any case no scores were presented. In addition, the
three studies cited above do not consider the role of
information, behaviour of farmers and service providers
in making animal health management decisions in real life.
Chilonda & Van Huylenbroeck [22] argue that the
study of the behaviour and decision-making processes of
farmers, service providers and their interactions in differ-
ent livestock production systems is a key to development
of sustainable policy options for successful delivery of
quality veterinary services to small-scale farmers.
Table 2 Random-effects panel probit model results for farmer’s decision to change a service provider
Probit model
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Female farmers -0.530* (-2.10) -0.25 (-1.08) -0.494* (-1.97)
Farmers’ pay-off from previous transaction -0.908*** (-3.42) -0.465* (-2.02)
Fees charged in previous transaction -0.117 (-0.47) -0.01 (-0.04) 0.176 (-0.71)
Intensive livestock production systems 1.372*** (-4.75) 0.966*** (-3.73)
Farmers with education 0.581* (-2.53)
Previous outcomes 0.676** (-2.76)
N 142 142 139
Wald chi2(4) 25.68 11.31 20.8
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Ilukor and Birner BMC Research Notes 2014, 7:894 Page 10 of 12
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literature as a tool that can serve as an accurate and con-
sistent method of assessment and decision forecasting
[23,24]. The tool captures complexities about actors
(farmers and service providers) decisions and behaviours
without losing reality [25-27]. The results show that while
paraprofessionals with no veterinary training were found
to be of low quality compared with service providers with
veterinary training, farmers changed their beliefs about
non veterinary trained paraprofessionals rather slowly,
thus providing few incentives for these paraprofessionals
to provide quality services. The slow pace by which
farmers were updating their beliefs about non veterinary
trained service providers was because these paraprofes-
sionals are known to farmers while veterinarians were
not known to farmers. Improving relations between para-
professionals and veterinarians, therefore, is a key to im-
proving quality of veterinary services [9]. However, this
depends on farmers’ ability to “punish” service providersFigure 13 The likelihood of changing to veterinarian
or paraprofessional.who provide poor quality services by shifting to quality
service providers. Model results show this depends on
their education level, outcomes of the service, and gender.
The fee charged for the previous transaction was
found not to have a significant impact on farmers’ deci-
sion to change their service provider. These findings are
consistent with findings by Ahuja, et al. [28]. They found
out that the price is not an important determinant of
farmers’ decision to use services of an alternative service
provider. In fact, Leonard [29] argues that the issue is
not that farmers are poor and unable to afford veterinary
services, but rather that farmers have failed to distin-
guish qualifications of different services providers and
the quality of services they offer. The use of animal
health cards or animal medical cards has a strong poten-
tial as a tool to enable farmers to distinguish and meas-
ure quality of clinical veterinary services. Farmers can
use exercise books and service providers could be asked
to write their diagnosis and prescription in these books.
The role play experiment used in this study assumes
that farmers do not self-treat, yet in reality farmers do
treat the animal themselves. Self-treatment as an option
was excluded because to include it the game would
mean promoting unethical behavior. Secondly, the game
assumed that the risk of an animal dying even when
treated correctly is zero, and yet an animal can actually
die even with the right treatment because of delayed
reporting and drug administration [30]. Thirdly, the ex-
periment assumed that veterinarians are always available
which is not always the case especially in the pastoral
system. Lastly, the limited number of participants could
limit validity of the results, but since “real” participants
(farmers and service providers) were involved in the
game, the results are still meaningful and valid.
Conclusions
In summary, this paper presents a systematic study on
how the interactions of farmers, veterinarians and para-
professionals influence the quality of clinical veterinary
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veterinary services provided by paraprofessionals with
veterinary training are not significantly different from
those of veterinarians. However, the quality of services
offered by paraprofessionals without veterinary training
is significantly lower than that of veterinary trained ser-
vice providers, but would improve as they interact with
trained service providers. Even though services offered
by paraprofessionals without veterinary training would
increase in quality from continued interaction with vet-
erinarians, there are challenges of sustaining paraprofes-
sional interaction with veterinarians. As the results show
increased risks of losing clients, limited number (avail-
ability) of veterinarians and the slow pace by which
farmers update their beliefs impede paraprofessional and
veterinary interaction. From a policy perspective, invest-
ment in two years of training for veterinary paraprofes-
sionals is a promising strategy for improving the quality
of veterinary services since farmers are willing to pay for
the private clinical veterinary services.
Endnotes
aThe Merck Veterinary manual for veterinary professionals
http://www.merckmanuals.com/merckmanualvet-book.htm.
bOIE technical disease cards http://www.oie.int/animal-
health-in-the-world/technical-disease-cards/.
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